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Abstract: Dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, yet violent 
and nonviolent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. We examine why some countries see the 
emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims, and why in some cases these 
organizational claims result in civil wars or nonviolent campaigns, while others see no large-scale 
collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the organized 
articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and nonviolent collective action. We 
test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random 
sample of 101 states from 1960-2012. We show that factors such as demography, economic 
development and civil society have differential effects on these different stages and outcomes of 
mobilization. We demonstrate that the common finding that anocracies are more prone to civil war 
primarily stems from such regimes being more prone to see maximalist political demands that could 
lead to violent mobilization, depending on other factors conducive to creating focused military 
capacity We find that non-democracy generally promotes nonviolent campaigns as anocracies and 
autocracies are both more likely to experience claims and more prone to nonviolent campaigns, 
conditional on claims. 
 
Keywords: civil war, nonviolent campaign, grievance 
Corresponding author: ksg@essex.ac.uk   
  2 
Introduction 
Beginning in 2011, a wave of anti-government mobilization swept across North Africa and the 
Middle East. Protests were generally seen as stemming from frustration with economic stagnation 
and repressive autocratic rule (e.g. Goldstone, 2011; Lynch, 2012). There was remarkable variation 
within the region in when and where dissidents articulated grievances against governments, and not 
all countries saw major mobilization. Moreover, the specific paths anti-regime action took varied 
dramatically among countries. Dissident tactics ranged from large-scale nonviolent mobilization in 
Tunisia and Egypt to violent rebellion in Libya and Syria. In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, smaller initial 
protests were met with massive repression and dissidents largely stayed quiescent. Countries such as 
Qatar and the UAE saw almost no organized articulation of anti-regime grievance or collective 
mobilization. 
This variation in dissident articulation of claims against governments and tactical choices is 
not limited to the Middle East and North Africa. Based on the data in Chenoweth & Ulfelder 
(2015), eighteen countries saw large-scale nonviolent campaigns in 2013 while twenty-seven 
experienced violent civil conflict according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project/Peace Research 
Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Melander et al., 2016). However, a much wider set of 
countries have domestic political organizations demanding major institutional changes or for the 
government to step down. Mobilization rarely emerges from a vacuum, but is typically spurred by 
organizations articulating grievances and claims. 
We examine why organized dissident activity emerges in some countries and not others, and 
also why organized dissident activity eventually rises to large-scale mobilization resulting in civil wars 
or nonviolent campaigns in some cases, but not others. We split the process leading to these 
outcomes into two stages. In the first, ‘claims’ stage, organizations articulate maximalist demands on 
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the government related to regime change, government composition, or electoral legitimacy that seek 
to fundamentally alter the political order.1 In the second, ‘contentious outcomes’ stage, dissidents 
either choose violent or nonviolent means to press demands, or remain quiescent. Dividing the 
process of mobilization into two stages allows us to develop propositions for why some countries 
see the emergence of claims and others do not, and why, within the set of countries with 
organizations advancing maximalist claims, some see violent mobilization, some see nonviolent 
mobilization, and others experience neither. We test these propositions using new data that identify 
the yearly incidence of claims over the government for a random sample of 101 countries (excluding 
consolidated democracies) over the period 1960-2012.  
We extend the existing literature in two important ways by examining jointly the 
determinants of contentious claims, civil war, and nonviolent campaigns. First, most existing studies 
consider the risk of conflict events in all units (e.g. states or groups), without distinguishing variation 
in prior motivation and mobilization. Second, there is a large body of literature on particular 
tactics—such as violent rebellion, terrorism, or nonviolent direct action—but much less comparative 
work on why actors chose one tactic over another. Many scholars recognize how actors can choose 
different tactics (e.g. Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1978), and some work examines the onset of various tactics 
or outcomes together. However, existing studies are generally limited to individual conflicts (e.g. 
Moore, 1998; Pearlman, 2011), specific regions (e.g. Asal et al., 2013; White et al, 2015), data on 
individual events rather than identifying campaigns or actors (e.g. Salehyan et al., 2012), or limited to 
                                                        
1  This conceptualization is similar to Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) who focus on maximalist 
demands and the Armed Conflict Dataset’s focus on conflicts over either territorial or governmental 
incompatibilities. 
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organizations making claims over self-determination (e.g. Cunningham, 2013). We examine the 
choice between violence and nonviolence within a broad set of disputes over government, providing 
a more general analysis of tactical choice. 
 Our findings contribute to our understanding of the processes leading to violent internal 
conflict and nonviolent campaign in a number of ways. We show that factors such as economic 
development and urbanization have differential effects on maximalist claims-making as well as 
whether civil war or nonviolent campaign follows this claims-making. The findings for regime type 
are particularly striking. While anocracies are more likely to see maximalist claims than democracies, 
they are not more likely to experience internal armed conflict conditional on claims. However, we 
find that anocracy promotes nonviolent action in both stages, first by making initial claims-making 
more likely and subsequently increasing the chance of nonviolent mass-mobilization. 
 
A two-stage model of claims and mass mobilization 
Most empirical research has focused on specific observable contentious outcomes—such as 
nonviolent campaigns or civil war2—and how these may be related to motivation and opportunities 
for mobilization.3 However, starting with large-scale collective action is akin to fast-forwarding to 
the first action scene in a movie, since large-scale action generally follows low-level collective action 
in initial group formation and articulation of demands. We argue that violent or nonviolent                                                         
2 Hegre & Sambanis (2006) conduct a sensitivity analysis of predictors in country-level analyses of 
civil war. There are fewer conventions in analyses of nonviolent campaign onset, but Chenoweth & 
Ulfelder (2015) discuss suggested candidate factors, with a focus on out-of-sample predictive ability. 
3 Young (2013) provides a theory of dissident mobilization prior to conflict crossing the civil war 
threshold. 
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campaigns are best understood as the end-stage of a longer process, starting with individuals 
developing awareness over incompatibilities or motivation over grievances, followed by explicit 
articulation of claims or demands on state authorities by some organization or group, before we 
ultimately see large-scale violent or nonviolent action. In some cases this chain may be very quick4, 
in other cases it may be drawn out, and many efforts to take on the state never rise to large-scale 
action. Yet, the almost exclusive focus on outcomes in existing empirical research neglects how 
motivation and opportunity structures interact with group characteristics and resources to make 
certain contentious outcomes more or less likely. We develop a theoretical framework that splits the 
process leading to large-scale nonviolent and violent mobilization into two distinct stages. 
 In the first ‘claims’ stage, organized actors articulate maximalist claims for political change. 
Claims generally fall into two broad categories—’territorial’ incompatibilities in which organizations 
call for greater control over some part of the state’s territory and ‘governmental’ incompatibilities, in 
which organizations make claims related to control of the central government. We focus on 
governmental incompatibilities, which have received less scholarly attention than separatist disputes, 
and are particularly likely to be relevant for nonviolent mobilization.5 
Governmental incompatibilities comprise organizations making maximalist claims, by which 
we mean demands relating to (a) the legitimacy of elections, (b) the composition of the government,                                                         
4 In a few cases, large-scale nonviolent or violent mobilization and the onset of claims may occur 
simultaneously.  
5 Cunningham (2014) provides data on organizations calling for greater self-determination for 1960-
2005 (i.e. incompatibilities over territory), and Cunningham, Dahl & Frugé (forthcoming) examine 
the use of nonviolent tactics in these self-determination movements. 
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or (c) regime change. Most countries have some people that harbor grievances against the 
government that could be considered ‘maximalist,’ and, in many cases, these individuals may even 
have articulated grievances in some public arena, such as print publications or online outlets. 
However, while individual claims in this sense are widespread, not all grievances move beyond the 
individual level to the public articulation of maximalist claims against the government by an 
organized group. That is, organizations articulating maximalist political grievances (governmental 
‘claims’ or ‘incompatibilities’) are not ubiquitous, rather, they vary considerably across countries and 
time. 
Organizations making maximalist claims are important since they generally coordinate the 
large-scale action resulting in civil war or nonviolent campaigns. Violent rebellion, terrorism, large-
scale protest, strikes, and other nonviolent action all require some level of coordination. As such, we 
see organizations making maximalist claims as a necessary condition for civil war and nonviolent 
campaigns. 
 While civil war and nonviolent campaigns imply maximalist claims by organizations, claims 
are not sufficient for large-scale mobilization. Many claims persist for years and never see large-scale 
contentious outcomes. For example, Kazakhstan has experienced near-constant maximalist claims-
making since independence in 1991. Opposition parties, such as Alga and Azamat, have alleged 
widespread fraud in elections and called for the resignation of president Nursultan Nazarbayev, but 
have never escalated their activity to armed conflict or nonviolent mass mobilization. In other cases, 
governmental incompatibilities take a long time to emerge or emerge very sparsely, despite clear 
grievances, such as in the case of the extremely repressive regime in North Korea. In some cases, 
civil wars or nonviolent campaigns follow very quickly (or begin simultaneously with) organizational 
claims. In the People's Republic of China, we have the near-simultaneous emergence of maximalist 
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claims and nonviolent mass-mobilization in such episodes as the ‘Democracy Wall’ movement 
(1976-79) and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.6 Afghanistan exhibits a similar pattern, with no 
claims on the central government prior to the civil war beginning in 1978. In yet another group of 
cases, however, claims emerge and are sustained for a long period, but only much later coalesce into 
mass mobilization. Ukraine offers an example of this pattern. Since the early 1990s, pro-reform 
opposition organizations have called for changes in the composition of government in order to 
reduce the role of politicians from the Soviet era. These claims persisted from the early 1990s and 
manifested relatively low levels of mobilization until the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw large-
scale protest in Kiev following allegations of electoral fraud by the governing party.    
 
Why claims? 
Why do organizations articulate maximalist political demands in some contexts and not in others? 
We argue there are two main determinants—the degree of grievance with the political system and 
the likely costs of collective action. The ubiquitous nature of grievances is a foundational assumption 
in the resource mobilization literature, which sees structural and ideational factors shaping resources 
as more important for mobilization (e.g. McAdam, 1982; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978). 
However, even if all groups have some grievances we do not expect all grievances to rise to the level 
of maximalist claims. Dissidents in developed and well-functioning democratic systems generally can 
pursue dissent through regular political channels. In more closed systems, by contrast, avenues for 
regular political participation are usually blocked, so aggrieved individuals are likely to see 
fundamental political change as necessary.                                                         
6 These episodes are recorded as nonviolent, maximalist campaigns in the NAVCO 2.0 data. 
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While grievance is important, we do not expect a simple, direct relationship between 
grievance and claims-making. Claims-making will also be influenced by the anticipated costs to 
collective action, given by the governments’ ability and willingness to repress dissent. A large body 
of scholarship has focused on how individuals’ decisions on whether to engage in collective action 
depend on their expectations about whether others will participate. The literature on thresholds and 
cascades focuses on how ties between individuals or changes in the information environment shape 
anticipation that others will participate (e.g. Granovetter, 1973, 1978; Lohmann, 1994). Individual 
thresholds—i.e. how many other people must be expected to join in mobilization before individuals 
will participate themselves—will also be a function of the government’s repressive capacity. Some 
governments permit organizational articulation of maximalist political demands through legal 
political channels without responding with repression. Other governments may have a desire to 
repress all dissent, but lack the capability to do so. In both of these cases, the costs of collective 
action are lower. However, in some states, governments have the desire and ability to repress any 
form of dissent, meaning collective action is likely to be very costly. In these societies, despite 
private grievances, individuals will see collective action as very risky, and will need to anticipate 
substantial participation by others in collective action to join in. 
In sum, we expect maximalist political demands (claims) to be most likely when (1) political 
grievances are high and (2) the anticipated costs to individuals of participating in collective dissent 
are low. In turn, we expect anticipated costs to be driven both by the number of other individuals 
expected to participate and by the ability and willingness of the government to repress dissent. 
This discussion leads to several empirical implications about conditions under which we 
expect maximalist political demands to be more likely. First, claims-making will be more common in 
mixed regimes (i.e. anocracies or semi-democracies) than in either autocracies or full democracies. In 
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full democracies, grievances will be lower, and democracy provides an opportunity for aggrieved 
individuals to seek redress through the regular political process. In full autocracies, individuals will 
have high grievances but will anticipate high costs for participating in collective action because full 
autocracies are generally more willing and able to effectively repress dissent. In mixed-regimes, by 
contrast, grievances will be relatively high and the costs to participation relatively low, leading to 
more frequent claims-making. 
 Second, as states become more developed, claims-making will decrease. Economic 
development, on average, reduces grievances, as it makes individuals better off. Additionally, as 
states become more developed, their governments gain greater ability to monitor their populations 
and respond to dissent, and therefore the costs of collective action rise as well. 
 Finally, dissidents with political grievances can be influenced by events in other disputes 
within the country and/or region. In some countries, the government faces challenges from self-
determination groups. The presence of other disputes can provide information to dissidents that the 
government is unable to effectively repress and thus indicate an opportunity for collective action. As 
such, we expect maximalist political demands over government to be more common when there are 
violent self-determination disputes in the country. 
 Dissidents can also receive information about the likely response of governments and their 
other citizens to claims-making from similar events in the region. Regimes often cluster 
geographically, and collective action in one country can influence events in its neighbors. Protests in 
neighboring states can create a demonstration effect for dissidents (Beissinger, 2007; Braithwaite et 
al., 2015; Gleditsch & Rivera, forthcoming). Indeed, in the Arab Spring, successful protest in Tunisia 
and Egypt inspired similar action in other countries across the region. We expect maximalist political 
demands to be more likely following claims in other countries in the neighborhood.  
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Explaining contentious outcomes 
Once we observe maximalist claims, why do we observe nonviolent mobilization in some cases, 
violent rebellion in others, and (in the majority of cases) no activity? We focus in the discussion 
below on the distinction between violent versus nonviolent tactics and the specific conditions that 
make each more likely.7  
Nonviolent action and violent rebellion are similar in objectives, as both seek to impose 
sufficient costs on the government that it makes concessions to dissident demands. However, they 
rely on different techniques to impose costs. One of the clearest conclusions from the existing 
literature is that effective nonviolence requires large numbers of participants (Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011; Dahl et al., 2017; DeNardo, 1995). Small protests or strikes are unlikely to put 
sufficient pressure on governments, but large-scale participation in protest campaigns can impose 
dramatic governance costs. Violent rebellion, by contrast, does not require large-scale participation 
to impose costs, but rather requires focused military capability and organization.  
We assume dissidents will choose strategies that maximize their chance of applying sufficient 
pressure to gain some or all of want they want. As such, we expect dissidents will engage in 
nonviolent resistance when they anticipate mobilizing large numbers of supporters, and violent 
rebellion when they anticipate being able to develop focused military capacity. 
 
                                                        
7 Although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive tactics, and different organizations might use 
different tactics in a dispute, we show below that it is very rare to see simultaneous nonviolent 
campaigns and civil war over the government. 
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Nonviolent mobilization 
Little or no initial training is required to participate in nonviolent dissent, and self-recruitment can 
be almost instantaneous during campaigns. We would expect to observe nonviolent campaigns 
following claims where organizations can mobilize large numbers of participants. Their ability to do 
so is affected by several factors. One important factor is regime type, but the effect here is different 
from that in claims-making. Once claims have been articulated, we expect nonviolent campaigns to 
be more likely in both anocracies and autocracies. In anocracies, grievances are high and the costs of 
protest are relatively low, thus organizing mass mobilization is easier. Although autocracies are less 
likely to see collective action unless individuals anticipate mass participation, crossing the threshold 
for claims and incipient collective action should help spur mass mobilization to nonviolent 
campaign, since individuals become more likely to participate when they observe others organizing. 
In line with Lohmann (1994) and Kuran (1995), once would-be protesters observe a smaller, 
dedicated group of dissidents emerging publicly to make claims on the government, they are much 
more likely to feel comfortable publicly expressing their previously privately-held grievances.  
A country’s demography also affects the ability to mobilize in a nonviolent campaign. 
Nonviolent efforts to challenge the government are unlikely to be successful unless there is some 
dissident presence in the capital city and other important urban centers (Dahl et al., 2017). This 
implies a greater challenge to mounting nonviolent campaigns in largely rural countries, where it is 
difficult for dissidents to mobilize against the government in the periphery. As such, we expect 
nonviolent campaign to be more likely in more urbanized countries. 
In addition, given claims, we expect nonviolent campaign to be more likely in more 
developed countries. An advanced distribution of labor makes individual citizens more dependent 
on the state, thereby increasing the ability of the state to sanction. But dependence also increases the 
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vulnerability of the state to non-cooperation and withdrawal of consent from citizens (e.g. Butcher 
& Svensson, 2016). For example, while a tax boycott has little effect in a rentier state that directly 
obtains revenue from natural resources, in a more advanced state that relies on taxes, widespread 
non-cooperation is much more damaging. As such, we expect wealthier states with claims to be 
more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns. 
The ability to organize a nonviolent campaign can also be influenced by social networks (e.g. 
Granovetter, 1973, 1978). Civil society comprises a set of organizations that can build ties between 
individuals and facilitate collective action. Given claims, states with a vibrant civil society should see 
a greater occurrence of nonviolent campaigns. Finally, specific tactics can be promoted by diffusion 
from events elsewhere. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia helped show the feasibility and 
effectiveness of nonviolent mobilization to individuals in other autocracies in the Middle East, and 
dissidents elsewhere explicitly emulated its main symbols (Brancati, 2016: 36). Gleditsch & Rivera 
(forthcoming) find evidence for diffusion of nonviolence across neighboring states and autocracies, 
and Braithwaite et al. (2015) find that emulation is particularly likely across autocracies when there is 
no recent history of domestic protests.  
Finally, dissident organizations have better prospects for large-scale mobilization when they 
can operate abroad. Although state repression and media censorship can undermine the ability to 
mobilize within a country, these features can be partly compensated by operating abroad. For 
example, Serb dissidents mobilizing against Milosevic in 1999 could organize training sessions in 
neighboring Hungary. It is more difficult for a government to suppress information about events to 
forestall mobilization if individuals have access to foreign media. 
 
Violent rebellion 
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While effective nonviolence generally requires large-scale participation, mass participation is not 
necessarily needed for violence. Rather, we expect violence to be more likely in countries with 
maximalist political demands when these countries have features conducive to organizing 
insurgency. We do not expect regime type to have an effect on civil war when we focus our analysis 
on cases with claims, because regime type should not directly affect the ability to organize 
insurgency. Rather, we expect regime type primarily to affect whether countries experience claims in 
the first place, not subsequent violence.8 
A country’s demographic structure, by contrast, should influence violence, given claims. A 
large literature has demonstrated that peripheral insurgency can effectively challenge the 
government, even with a limited number of fighters (Butler & Gates, 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
Urban guerrilla movements are in principle possible, but have been consistently unsuccessful (della 
Porta, 2006). As such, for demography, our prediction for violence is the inverse of that for 
nonviolence—civil war will be more likely in states with a more rural population. 
 State capacity should also influence civil war. While a higher degree of economic 
development can make nonviolent campaigns more likely, it should make violent rebellion less likely. 
As economic development increases, state capacity generally also increases, and states can extend 
their control further. This repressive capacity allows states to block dissidents from organizing 
                                                        
8 A central empirical finding is that anocracies or semi-democracies seem more prone to civil war 
than either full democracies or full autocracies. However, Vreeland (2008) argues that such findings 
stem from how the Polity regime data incorporates ongoing political violence into the coding of 
factionalist characteristics associated with anocracy.  
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violence, raising the costs of civil war. Indeed, one of the strongest findings in the literature is that 
civil wars are less common in more wealthy states. 
 In our discussion of claims-making we argued that concurrent violent territorial disputes 
should increase claims-making. We also expect the presence of civil wars over self-determination to 
have similar effects on the likelihood of violent rebellion in governmental disputes, given claims, 
although with a different mechanism. An ongoing territorial civil war restricts the available 
governmental forces to prevent a nascent governmental incompatibility from escalating, but it may 
also make training, weapons, and other military material more accessible.  
As with nonviolent campaigns, we also expect that transnational dimensions will influence 
the ability to organize violence. Research on civil war has shown that violent mobilization is more 
likely when groups can rely on resources from kin or governments in neighboring states, or if rebels 
can benefit from access to external bases or sanctuaries (Gleditsch, 2007; Salehyan, 2009). In violent 
regional neighborhoods, escalating claims to violent mobilization is easier, and we expect violent 
rebellion to be more likely in such cases. 
The above discussion related to how different factors affect dissident choices to articulate 
maximalist claims against governments and subsequently to organize mass nonviolent mobilization 
or to violently rebel. In our empirical analysis, we will test these expectations by examining the 
occurrence of governmental incompatibilities, nonviolent campaigns, and civil war. We appreciate 
that we test overall outcomes that depend in part on the government responses rather than dissident 
tactics alone. We may miss attempts at large scale mobilization where deaths or mobilization do not 
exceed the threshold. However, these outcomes will still allow us to test the implications of our 
theory, since they imply dissident intent. 
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In summary, our expectations are that, conditional on an articulated incompatibility, 
nonviolent campaigns will be more likely in countries that are primarily urban and civil war in 
countries that are primarily rural. Countries at higher levels of economic development will be more 
likely to experience nonviolent campaigns and less likely to see civil war. Nonviolent campaigns will 
be more likely in states with a higher density of civil society organizations, while we do not have a 
prediction for their effect on civil war. Governmental civil wars will be more likely in countries 
experiencing territorial civil wars, but we do not have a similar prediction for nonviolent campaigns. 
Autocracies and anocracies should be prone to nonviolent campaigns, but we do not expect this to 
extend to civil war. For both civil war and nonviolent campaigns, we expect transnational, 
‘neighborhood’ factors to make mobilization more likely. Table 1 summarizes these expectations.  
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Table 1. Predictions about claims, nonviolent campaigns, and civil war 
 
Concept 
 
Effect on claims 
Conditional on claims 
Effect on nonviolent 
campaign Effect on civil war 
Regime type-autocracy No effect + No effect 
Regime type-anocracy + + No effect 
Urban population No prediction + No effect 
Rural population No prediction No effect + 
Economic development - + - 
Civil society No prediction + No effect 
Territorial civil wars + No prediction + 
Neighborhood effects + + + 
 
Research Design 
We test the predictions in Table 1 using the new Governmental Incompatibilities Data Project 
(GIDP) dataset. The GIDP provides data on the occurrence of organizations making maximalist 
claims over government for 101 countries for the period 1960-2012, collected in random order from 
all countries in the world, excluding consolidated democracies. 9  The GIDP data are, to our 
knowledge, unique in providing information on dissident organizations making maximalist claims 
independently from organized violence or large-scale mobilization.  
 We use a random sample because randomization assures that the cases selected should not 
deviate in any systematic manner from the population. Excluding consolidated democracies, there 
are 155 relevant countries, covering about 65% of the population of all states over the period 1960-
                                                        
9 We define consolidated democracies as countries with a combined Polity score that does not drop 
below 7 between 1960-2012 and which maintain this score for at least 25 years, and without any 
disputed elections identified by the NELDA project (Hyde & Marinov, 2012).  
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2012. Figure 1 shows the countries included in the sample. Our random sample does not over-
represent any particular region in the world, and the average values for key covariates in our sample 
do not deviate from the global average for states other than consolidated democracies, suggesting 
that it is representative as well as random.10  
 
Figure 1. Random sample of countries included in the GIDP (1960-2012) 
 
To identify incompatibilities over government, we focus on the articulation of maximalist 
claims by organizations that exist outside the government that may not reach large-scale mobilization, 
but entail more than isolated dissidents. Building on the ACD definition (Melander et al., 2016), a 
maximalist claim over government can be manifested by either claims over electoral legitimacy (i.e. the 
conduct of or circumstances under which elections or referenda took place—e.g. claims of electoral                                                         
10 More specifically, the average log GDP per capita in our sample is 7.43, compared to 7.55 in the 
global population of states other than consolidated democracies. The average log population in our 
sample is 8.95, while it is 8.40 in the global population. And the average Polity score in our sample is 
-1.36, compared to -0.93 in the global sample. 
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fraud), government composition (i.e. the removal of high-ranking government officials such as the state 
leader or cabinet-level ministers—outside of regular, institutional processes), or regime change, (i.e. 
calls for fundamental changes to the political system or political institutions). This definition of 
maximalist claims excludes claims limited to policy, like protest over austerity measures, which 
typically do not challenge the overall political system per se. We provide further details on the coding 
procedures and sources in the Online appendix. 
 We code claims as present as long as there are not two years without observed claims-
making. This two-year intermittency rule was adopted to appropriately code the absence of a 
governmental incompatibility.11 Table 2 shows the distribution of this binary variable in the data. 
Maximalist claims are relatively common, but certainly not ubiquitous—occurring in slightly more 
than half of country-years. We see substantial within country variation as well. In Oman we identify 
claims in 12 out of 53 years (22.6%), while in Iran we identify them in 40 out of 53 years (75.5%). 
We find no claims in only two countries—Latvia and Qatar.12 
 
  
                                                        
11 Since we rely on secondary sources, it is unlikely that a single year without claims-making between 
two periods of observed claims-making truly reflects a clear end of a prior claim. 
12  We provide a list of all countries included and number of years with claims in the Online 
appendix. 
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Table 2. Yearly claim incidence of government incompatibilities in 101 countries (1960-2012) 
No   2,158 (47.93%) 
 
Yes   2,344 (52.07%)   
 
In the analysis we consider the onset and emergence of claims as well as the likelihood of 
specific contentious outcomes, given claims. In the claims stage, we examine how factors influence 
both the onset and incidence of governmental incompatibilities, using the binary indicator of claims-
making. Examining onset and incidence in separate models allows us to consider how variables 
affect the start of claims as well as their propensity to continue once started.13 In the second set of 
analyses, we use censored probit to examine the onset and incidence of nonviolent and violent 
mobilization, given claims. Censored probit allows for correlation between errors between the 
equations, which may arise if unobserved factors in the first stage also exert an outcome at the 
second stage. The ‘selection’ stage considers whether a country experienced claims in a given year, 
and the outcome stage whether we have violent or nonviolent mobilization. In total, we have two 
logistic regressions for the likelihood of claims onset and incidence in a given country-year, and four 
                                                        
13 In the claims onset analysis, the sample is all country-years following two years without any claims 
recorded and in the claims incidence analysis all country-years are included. 
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censored probit regressions for nonviolent campaign and civil war onset and incidence, conditional 
on the existence of claims in a given country-year.14  
Table 3 shows the number of years in which we identify claims in our random sample of 101 
countries and whether we observe civil wars and nonviolent campaigns. We identify violent civil 
conflicts over the government based on the ACD data, i.e. excluding territorial civil wars. We also 
exclude civil wars that are merely particularly violent coups to ensure we focus on violent rebellion 
by dissidents rather than intra-elite violence (based on Thyne & Powell, 2011). Our measure of 
nonviolent campaign is from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data 
(NAVCO, Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013), excluding nonviolent campaigns over issues other than the 
government such as secessionism, anti-occupation movements, or regional autonomy.15 
 
Table 3. Civil war and nonviolent mobilization during years with claims 
 
 
Nonviolent campaign 
Civil war No Yes 
No 1,457 (73.88%) 116 (5.88%) 
Yes 389 (19.73%) 10 (0.51%) 
 
                                                        
14 In the civil war and nonviolent campaign onset analyses, the sample includes all claims-years 
following two years without a governmental armed conflict or nonviolent campaign, respectively. 
The two incidence models include all country-years. 
15 We include one anti-occupation campaign—the 1968 Czech Anti-Soviet Occupation—since the 
protests also involved claims related to the Czech puppet regime. 
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Table 3 shows that a large majority of years in which countries had organizations making 
maximalist claims saw no civil war or nonviolent campaigns (73.88%). It also shows country-years 
with civil war (399) are far more common than those with nonviolent campaigns (126). The higher 
frequency of civil wars is in part due to their longer duration, as nonviolent campaigns tend to either 
succeed or fail relatively quickly and mass mobilization is difficult for long time periods.16 Finally, 
Table 3 shows that simultaneous nonviolent campaigns and civil war over the government are quite 
rare (10 of 1,972 country-years). 
Our theoretical framework identifies regime type as a first factor influencing contentious 
outcomes. We measure regime type using the three subcomponents from the Polity IV index 
(Marshall et al., 2002) —Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP), Executive 
Constraints (XCONST), and the Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN), which Vreeland 
(2008) uses to construct his XPOLITY measure. We modified the XPOLITY measure slightly to 
incorporate the Polity2 variable's decision-rules for dealing with missing values for foreign 
occupations, transition periods, and interregnums.17 This produces a 14-point Polity scale ranging 
from -6 to 7 (including 0). From this we generated binary indicators for autocracy (ranging from -6 
to -3) and anocracy (from -2 to 3), which we compare to democracies (between 4 and 7) as the base 
category.  
                                                        
16 There are 41 country-years with civil war onsets relative to 81 country-years with nonviolent 
campaign onsets.  
17 We coded foreign occupations as missing, interregnums as the ‘neutral’ value of 0, and ‘pro-rated’ 
(i.e. linearly interpolated) transitions between the beginning and end of the transition periods. 
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The second set of variables focuses on demography and economic development. For the 
first, we consider the total urban population and total rural population (both log-transformed) from 
United Nations data (2014), and for the second we use the natural log of GDP per capita from 
Gleditsch (2002).  
 To examine the effect of civil society strength, we use a measure of international 
connectivity based on Smith & Weist (2012), counting the number of international NGO (INGO) 
chapters in a particular country-year. The data accounts for 2-3 years for each country; accordingly 
we linearly interpolate missing values for the intervening country-years. 
 We create two variables for neighborhood effects. In the armed conflict model, we include a 
binary indicator of whether there was an armed conflict over government in a neighboring country 
within 500 kilometers of the country's borders.18 A similar variable was included for neighboring 
nonviolent campaigns over the government (from NAVCO) in the nonviolent campaign model. We 
cannot conclusively examine the effect of the diffusion of claims without global data. However, to 
see if nonviolent campaigns in neighboring countries make claims more likely, we include the 
measure of transnational nonviolent campaign in the claims model as well. To measure the effect of 
territorial conflict within the country, we use the ACD to generate a dichotomous measure of 
whether the country is experiencing an internal armed conflict over territory in the year. The Online 
Appendix reports the descriptive statistics of the variables.  
We use a slightly different specification in the two stage models than the logit models of 
claims onset and incidence. To ensure identification, a censored probit should have at least one 
predictor for the selection equation not related to the outcome. Accordingly, since we expect                                                         
18 Based on minimum distances from Cshapes (Weidmann et al., 2010). 
  23 
diffusion to be limited to the specific type of mobilization, and not diffusion across tactics (see 
Gleditsch & Rivera, forthcoming), we include the neighboring civil war over government variable 
only in the selection (claims) stage of the nonviolent campaign model, and the neighboring 
nonviolent campaign variable only in the selection (claims) stage of the civil war model.  
We lag the independent variables by one year to avoid simultaneous influences from the 
outcomes we examine. Since the errors may vary systematically by country, we report robust 
standard errors clustered by country. To deal with temporal dependence, we include—but do not 
report—cubic polynomials of the time since each outcome in each model (Carter & Signorino, 
2010).19 Table 4 reports the results of the logit analyses of claims onset and incidence, while Table 5 
reports the results of the censored probit analysis of civil war and nonviolent campaign conditional 
on claims. 
  
                                                        
19 In each of the selection equations we included a cubic polynomial of time since claims—which did 
not appear in the respective outcome equation. 
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Results 
Table 4. Logit analysis of claims incidence and onset 
 Claims incidence Claims onset 
Autocracy 0.336* 0.121 
 (0.139) (0.205) 
Anocracy 0.904** 0.656** 
 (0.186) (0.244) 
GDP per capita 0.080 -0.006 
 (0.082) (0.087) 
Urban population 0.032 0.005 
 (0.084) (0.093) 
Rural population 0.147 0.090 
 (0.102) (0.095) 
INGO chapters -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Territorial civil war 0.624* 0.690* 
 (0.306) (0.273) 
Neighboring nonviolent campaign 0.358** 0.559** 
 (0.135) (0.152) 
Constant -1.143 -2.745** 
 (0.918) (0.789) 
Observations 3,353 1,666 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown. 
 
 
 The logit analyses of claims incidence and onset in Table 4 generally support the predictions 
in Table 1. With regards to regime type, we find as expected that anocracies are the most likely to 
experience both the onset and incidence of claims, as the variable is positive and significant, and the 
coefficient is quite large relative to autocracy and democracy—the base category. Autocracy is 
significant at conventional levels in the incidence model, but the coefficient is less than half the size 
of that of anocracy and it is insignificant in the onset model. This insignificance suggests that, in line 
with our theoretical expectations, it is difficult for overt claims-making to be established in 
autocracies relative to anocracies. The positive and significant finding for autocracy in the claims 
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incidence models suggests that once maximalist claims are made in autocracies they last longer than 
in democracies. 
In Figure 2 we plot the predicted probabilities from the claims models, conditional on 
regime-type in the prior year. These results show that, on average and holding other factors 
constant, a democracy has a likelihood of 46.72% of claims incidence and a likelihood of 13.26% of 
seeing the onset of claims. For anocracies the likelihoods are 59.56% (incidence) and 22.34% 
(onset), and for autocracies, they are 51.69% (incidence) and 14.67% (onset). Put differently, 
anocracies are, on average, 27.49% more likely to see claims incidence than democracies, while 
autocracies are only 10.66% more likely. The difference is much starker for the onset of claims: 
anocracies are 68.49% more likely to see the onset of claims than democracies, while autocracies are 
only 10.64% more likely. 
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Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of claims incidence and onset for different regime-types 
 
  Note: Bars next to point estimates indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 5. Censored probit models of claims and mobilization outcomes 
 Nonviolent campaign Civil war 
 Onset Claims  Incidence Claims Onset Claims Incidence Claims 
Autocracy 0.779* 0.122 1.179** 0.154+ -0.141 0.115 0.161 0.194* 
 (0.316) (0.082) (0.324) (0.080) (0.169) (0.083) (0.144) (0.082) 
Anocracy 0.432 0.498** 0.814* 0.510** -0.116 0.429** 0.143 0.528** 
 (0.350) (0.107) (0.341) (0.107) (0.229) (0.117) (0.169) (0.108) 
GDP per capita 0.071 0.039 0.079 0.045 0.034 0.028 -0.075 0.045 
 (0.101) (0.046) (0.096) (0.045) (0.102) (0.049) (0.090) (0.047) 
Urban population 0.069 0.015 0.124 0.016 -0.108 0.060 -0.173* 0.011 
 (0.093) (0.048) (0.100) (0.046) (0.098) (0.049) (0.071) (0.049) 
Rural population 0.067 0.081 -0.042 0.088 0.152 0.029 0.146+ 0.092 
 (0.097) (0.059) (0.089) (0.057) (0.110) (0.056) (0.086) (0.059) 
INGO chapters 0.003* -0.000 0.006** -0.000 -0.003+ -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Territorial civil war -0.615+ 0.330+ -0.395 0.308+ 0.187 0.274+ 0.223 0.357* 
 (0.342) (0.173) (0.319) (0.173) (0.263) (0.155) (0.153) (0.175) 
Neighboring nonviolent campaign 0.332*  0.316*   0.220**  0.210** 
 (0.134)  (0.138)   (0.079)  (0.075) 
Neighboring civil war over government  0.192**  0.176* 0.083  0.336**  
  (0.074)  (0.071) (0.120)  (0.110)  
Constant -4.958** -0.578 -3.117** -0.669 -1.854+ -0.390 0.589 -0.633 
 (1.103) (0.534) (0.879) (0.522) (0.998) (0.494) (0.884) (0.526) 
Rho  0.115  0.045  -0.193  -0.166 
  (0.167)  (0.182)  (0.189)  (0.146) 
Observations 3,265 3,265 3,373 3,373 2,852 2,852 3,353 3,353 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown
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Turning to the two-stage models of civil war and nonviolent campaign (Table 5), results 
from the censored probits are also consistent with the theoretical expectations in Table 1. Both 
autocracy and anocracy are highly significant with large coefficients for nonviolent campaign 
incidence, meaning that once claims are observed in both types of non-democracies, they are much 
more likely to experience large-scale protest campaigns than democracies with similar maximalist 
political demands. This shows that anocracy, in particular, can have a dual effect on nonviolent 
campaigns—we are more likely to see the start and endurance of collective articulation of maximalist 
political demands in anocracies, and it is much more likely that nonviolent campaigns take place 
subsequent to claims in such states.20 Curiously, the anocracy indicator is insignificant in the onset 
model for nonviolent campaigns, although it is positive (the expected direction). 
Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities generated from the nonviolent campaign onset and 
incidence models, depending on regime-type in the prior year and conditional on claims. These 
results show that an (unconsolidated) democracy has a likelihood of 1.97% of nonviolent 
mobilization, while anocracies and autocracies have a 5.87% and 9.10% chance, respectively. For 
                                                        
20 The estimated correlation between the errors is modest and insignificant in all the models in Table 
5. Since the efficiency of the selection model may be questionable in this case (see Vance & Ritter, 
2014), we provide alternative two-part estimates in the Online appendix, treating the second stage 
outcomes for country-years as independent of the first stage. Our main findings do not generally 
change from the censored probit, although autocracy and anocracy become significantly positively 
associated with civil war incidence, and the positive coefficient for territorial civil war becomes 
marginally significant. 
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onset, the probabilities are lower—given the rarity of the onset of nonviolent campaigns, but the 
same overall pattern holds: 0.94% for unconsolidated democracies, 2.30% for anocracies, and 4.42% 
for autocracies. 
 
Figure 3. Predicted probability of nonviolent campaign incidence and onset for different regime-
types, conditional on claims 
 
 
Note: Bars next to point estimates indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Neither autocracy nor anocracy, meanwhile, are statistically significant for either the 
incidence or onset of civil war, given claims. This is striking, given the general (if disputed, per 
Vreeland, 2008) finding in the civil war literature that anocracies are most prone to civil war (e.g. 
Hegre et al., 2001). By splitting the process leading to civil war into two stages, we find that 
anocracies are more likely to experience maximalist political demands that may lead to civil war, but, 
conditional upon these claims being present, civil war is not more likely. This suggests that anocracy 
provides an opportunity structure for initial mobilization that might become violent or nonviolent 
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rather that a direct effect on civil war per se. Other factors influence whether or not nascent disputes 
over government in anocracies escalate to civil war. 
 The findings on demography provide weaker support for the expectations from our theory, 
possibly reflecting that they provide crude measures of resources. Neither the urban nor the rural 
population terms are statistically significant for either the onset or incidence of claims, as expected. 
Conditional upon claims, the coefficient for urban population is positive (as expected), suggesting a 
higher likelihood of nonviolent campaign, but this does not reach the conventional statistical 
significance threshold in the onset or incidence models.21 And while not anticipated, countries with 
large urban populations are less likely to see the incidence of civil war—though this finding does not 
extend to onset. This suggests that urbanization does not exert a significant impact on whether 
dissidents initially resort to violence in pursuing maximalist claims, but reduces the likelihood that 
violent mobilization is able to continue in the years after the onset of violence.22 We see some 
evidence for our expectation that rural population makes violent conflict more likely (the coefficient 
                                                        
21 Some of this may be attributed to the United Nations data on demographics, which does not 
include defunct states. This excludes East Germany and Czechoslovakia—which were relatively 
urbanized and saw large-scale nonviolent mobilization in the late-1980s. Another factor is the 
relative rarity of civil war onsets (55) versus incidence (397) in our sample, which inevitably will 
increase uncertainty over coefficient estimates. 
22 In separate analyses, we replaced the urban and rural population measures with a single measure of 
total population (logged, from Gleditsch, 2002) and find no substantive change to the main results. 
Total population was significant and positive in the claims incidence model only; in all other models 
it was insignificant. 
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is positive and significant at the .10 level in the incidence model). Economic development, 
meanwhile, is not significant in any of the models.23 
 Our measure of civil society shows effects generally consistent with expectations. The 
number of international NGOs present in the country is highly significant and positive for 
nonviolent campaign onset and incidence, and has no effect on claims-making. Interestingly, while 
we anticipated no effect for civil society on civil war, given claims, the impact is actually negative and 
significant at the .10 level in the civil onset model. This suggests that civil society can play an 
important role in mobilizing citizen participation in large-scale protests in countries with maximalist 
demands, but makes violent mobilization less likely by providing a more favorable opportunity 
structure for nonviolent mobilization. 
 The effect of territorial civil war in the country is generally consistent with our expectations 
with regards to the onset and incidence of maximalist claims. We argued that territorial civil war 
would provide opportunities to challenge the regime, and we find a statistically significant and 
positive effect on claims. However, while the coefficient for territorial civil war is positive in both 
the incidence and onset models of governmental civil war, neither reaches significance at 
conventional levels.  
 The neighborhood variables show interesting patterns generally consistent with our 
expectations. Neighboring nonviolent campaigns are significant and positive in both the onset and 
incidence models for claims and for nonviolent mobilization, while neighboring civil war over 
government is significant and positive in the civil war incidence model, and positive but insignificant                                                         
23 By excluding consolidated democracies, we have removed some of the most developed states, 
which might have contributed to this null result. 
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in the onset analysis. Generally, the results suggest that armed conflicts over government are more 
likely when an armed conflict over government occurs in a country in that state's neighborhood—
consistent with literature on the diffusion of civil war (Gleditsch, 2007). The findings in the 
nonviolent mobilization models are consistent with studies showing nonviolent campaigns diffuse 
spatially (Braithwaite et al., 2015; Gleditsch & Rivera, forthcoming), but the finding that nonviolent 
campaign in the neighborhood makes claims more likely suggests a further mechanism for diffusion. 
Large-scale challenges to governments in one state can serve as an initial spark to dissident 
challenges in others and then also increase significantly the chances of mass mobilization.24 
 
Further analyses 
We conducted a battery of robustness checks on both our analysis of claims and of mobilization 
outcomes, conditional on claims (reported in the Online appendix). We consider possible crossover 
effects of civil war and nonviolent campaign, by including the number of years since the other type 
of contentious outcome. We found no substantive change to our main results, save for a slight 
decrease for the civil society measure on the nonviolent campaign onset model. We also looked at 
leader tenure as another measure of stability (Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza, 2009). Leader tenure 
is positively and significantly associated with the incidence of maximalist claims, however, including 
tenure did not lead to any substantive changes to our findings.  
 When restricting violent mobilization models to conflict-years that exceed 1,000 battle-
deaths we find that autocracy becomes significant at conventional levels in both the onset and the                                                         
24 We also tested the effect of neighboring armed conflict over government on claims-making and 
found a positive and significant effect for incidence and a positive, but insignificant result for onset. 
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incidence models, while anocracy achieves weak significance in only the incidence model. This 
suggests that violent contests over government can escalate at a greater rate in autocracies. Still, the 
results remain consistent with our main findings and expectations for anocracy; the effect of 
anocracy on civil war is primarily at the claims stage, rather than at the escalation to civil war.  
 In addition, we replaced GDP per capita with two alternative measures of state capacity—
the Relative Political Reach index (RPR, Kugler & Tammen, 2012)25 and Hendrix & Young's (2014) 
latent measure of military capabilities. Our findings regarding anocracies’ large effect on claims 
remain unchanged. Greater bureaucratic capacity is significantly and positively associated with the 
onset and incidence of nonviolent campaigns, given claims. Military capacity is negatively and 
significantly associated with the onset of claims—though not incidence. 
 Finally, there is a plausible concern that our use of the ‘neighboring’ mobilization indicator 
in the selection (claims) stage may be affected by claims in a given country, as well as affect the 
likelihood of mobilization overall. To provide added confidence that reverse causality does not drive 
our finding, we introduce an indicator for whether a neighbor of a neighbor was experiencing either civil 
war or a nonviolent campaign (see Braumoullé et al., 2009). These analyses do not lead to any 
substantive change to our main findings. 
 
Conclusion 
Civil wars and nonviolent campaigns rarely explode out of nowhere, rather, they typically arise out 
of a prior interaction between regimes and dissidents in which dissidents advance maximalist goals 
                                                        
25 We also drop urban and rural population from these models, since total population and the 
proportion of the population that is urbanized are components of the index.  
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and regimes try to respond to them. Much of the literature on civil war and nonviolent campaigns, 
however, ignores this initial claims-making phase and instead focuses directly on the latter stage. In 
so doing, it cannot explain why some countries do not have organizations making maximalist 
political demands and others do, and why, within the set that do, some see large-scale mass 
mobilization, others see peripheral insurgency, and still others avoid large-scale outcomes. 
 In this article, we develop a theoretical framework that examines these two stages separately 
and test empirical implications arising from that framework using new data on incompatibilities over 
government. These analyses reveal interesting insights into the effect of factors such as economic 
development, civil society, and diffusion on nonviolent campaigns and civil war. The findings on 
regime type are particularly striking. We show that the common finding that anocracies are more 
prone to civil war primarily stems from them being more prone to maximalist political demands that 
could lead to violent mobilization, depending on other factors conducive to creating focused military 
capacity. Being a non-democracy has a double effect at promoting nonviolent campaign, however, 
since anocracies and autocracies are both more likely to experience claims and, given claims, more 
prone to nonviolent campaigns. The relationship between regime type and contentious politics is 
complex, and analyzing the process leading to large-scale action in two stages enables us to more 
clearly identify the mechanisms behind the correlations between factors such as regime type, 
demography, and civil war and nonviolent campaigns.  
 The data that we present here has the additional potential to contribute to our understanding 
of external actions that make violence more or less likely. A large body of scholarship has examined 
how different international actions—such as peacekeeping, mediation, and military intervention—
contribute to conflict resolution. However, there is little work on how these factors might make the 
outbreak of civil war more or less likely since it is difficult to identify disputes with the potential to 
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be civil wars but with variation in violence. These governmental incompatibilities can be seen as a 
sample of potential civil wars, and research could examine how actions taken in dispute years 
influence the likelihood of violence.26 
 In addition, future research could focus more directly on the organizations articulating 
maximalist political demands, and examine how characteristics of these organizations influence 
whether or how large-scale mobilization occurs. The literature on civil war has advanced in recent 
years through analysis of characteristics of actors such as rebel groups (see, for example, 
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). However, studies of civil war onset and nonviolent 
campaigns generally lack information on dissidents themselves, and typically do not incorporate 
features of these organizations into analysis of these outcomes. Through identifying governmental 
incompatibilities we can analyze why organizations adopt different strategies. 
 
Replication data 
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, as well as the Online appendix, can 
be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. 
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